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INTRODUCTION 
Shareholder activism has been a key element of the recent debate in Australia concerning 
corporate governance and shareholder engagement in recent years. Part of that dialogue 
has involved the question of whether ‘US-style’ activism in the mould of Carl Icahn, Bill 
Ackerman and Daniel Loeb will make its way down under and start affecting ASX listed 
companies.  
  
This note considers several recent cases involving different types of shareholder activists 
and their use of provisions in the Corporations Act to push their activist agenda along. This 
note focusses particularly on the scope of s 249N, although it draws on other provisions 
such as s 249D (relating to requisitioning members meetings) and those dealing with 
director and executive remuneration. Section 249N allows members with 5% of the votes 
that may be cast on a resolution or 100 members entitled to vote on a resolution to propose 
a resolution at a members’ meeting by giving the company written notice of the proposed 
resolution. The members must also sign the notice.  
 
Section 49N should be viewed in conjunction with other shareholder empowerment 
provisions including the power to: 
 Requisition the company to convene a meeting of the members under s 249D 
(members with at least 5% of the votes that may be cast at the general meeting 
must sign the requisition) 
 Hold a general meeting under s 249F (the same 5% voting threshold is required)  
 Request a company to its members a statement about a proposed resolution or 
about any other matter that may be properly considered at a general meeting: s 
249P. This applies where members with at least 5% of the votes that may be cast on 
the resolution or at least 100 members entitled to vote at the moment make the 
request.  
 
Section 249D was changed in 2015 to drop the former 100 member rule.   
 
While these provisions promote shareholder empowerment and engagement as they give 
members a voice and the capacity to raise matters within the decision making processes of 
the company, they also give rise to a tension with the management power typically given to 
the board of directors either under s 198A (a replaceable rule) or otherwise in the 
company’s constitution. This raises the question of to what extent can activist investors use 
proposed resolutions to push their agenda whether in the best interests of the company or 
even to promote their own interests. This note considers the implications of several recent 
cases that have examined this issue.  
WHAT IS AN ACTIVIST INVESTOR? 
Activist investors come in many shapes and sizes. A simple definition of an activist investor 
is one who is seeking to influence the management of a particular company.1 As to what the 
                                                     
1 See du Plessis, Hargovan, Bargaric and Harris, Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance, 3rd ed, 
Cambridge University Press, 2015, Ch 13. 
activist may be seeking influence for, that can range of direct control through board 
representation, whether that is control for its own sake or board representation merely as a 
tactic to influence management policy.  
 
Aside from board representation, activists typically criticise particular management 
decisions or policies with a view to pressuring the company to: 
 increase dividends 
 undertake a capital reduction such as a buy back 
 make an in specie distribution to investors 
 spin off one or more divisions of the company to focus on ‘core business’ 
 close a loss making division of the business 
 abandon or change expansion plans 
 sell the company through a takeover or merger 
 abandon or change capital raising plans 
 change executive or board positions 
 change remuneration policy 
 
For present purposes we may draw a distinction between activist investors who are: 
1) concerned with improving a company’s economic performance. This may be 
ostensibly for the benefit of all investors but the activist is usually seeking a personal 
benefit of themselves through higher returns; and  
 
2) those who are pressuring the company to make changes to its management as part 
of a social issues campaign. Organisations such as GetUp, Australian Centre for 
Corporate Responsibility and union investor campaigns fall into this latter category.2 
 
In the former category we can place institutional investors who adopt an activist strategy as 
part of a diversified investment strategy, such as the recent examples involving UniSuper 
and Westfield, and Perpetual and Brickworks and Allan Gray and Roc Oil. We can also 
include specialist activist hedge funds and professional activist investors into this first 
category.  
 
We can exclude individual activists such as Stephen Mayne or Jack Tilburn because they are 
unlikely to meet the 5% of votes or 100 member thresholds. This working definition also 
excludes proxy advisors and shareholder associations as they are not themselves investors, 
even though they are advocating for change.  
 
TECHNIQUES USED BY ACTIVIST INVESTORS 
Activist investors may use a variety of techniques to achieve their aims. These may include 
soft informal approaches or formal written letters to the company, which may then be 
released to the public to put the target company under public pressure. Leaks to the media 
and formal media interviews are also a common tactic to increase the public focus on the 
tension within the company and to highlight the criticisms of the activist. This has been used 
most prominently by Mark Carnegie in recent times in Australia. Another emerging trend 
                                                     
2 See further Kirsten Anderson and Ian Ramsay, ‘From the Picket Line to the Board Room: Union Shareholder 
Activism in Australia’ (2006) 24 C&SLJ 279. 
has been the use of social media by high profile fund managers to criticise the company and 
build public support for their activist goals. This is used to great effect by well known US 
based activist investors such as Carl Icahn who has more than 250,000 followers on Twitter. 
Warren Buffett has more than 1 million followers on Twitter. 
 
Aside from seeking to name and shame targets, activists may also use equity derivatives 
(such as swaps), options and stock lending to put their finger on potentially large amounts 
of shares without actually having to purchase the shares on market and flag a potential 
takeover to the market which may drive up the share price and lessen the activist’s 
argument about under performance. The use of equity derivatives has been seen in recent 
activist moves involving Echo Entertainment, Qantas and Fairfax. 
 
Activists may also use members’ rights under the Corporations Act, such as making a push 
to vote against remuneration reports of publicly listed companies and requisitioning a 
members’ meeting to vote on proposed resolutions including perhaps to remove directors 
or to appoint new directors. The power to propose resolutions at a members’ meeting has 
been considered in two recent cases in the last 12 months which will now be discussed. 
However, before we discuss these recent cases it is worth noting the traditional view 
regarding the distribution of power between the board and the members meeting. 
 
BALANCING POWER BETWEEN THE COMPANY’S DECISION-MAKING ORGANS 
Section 198A of the Corporations Act provides a default rule that the business of the 
company is to be managed by, or under the direction of, the board of directors. This rule is 
either adopted or modified slightly by virtually all companies, although it may be preferable 
in some closely held companies that the board’s management power be checked by the 
members or by a governing director/founding director which can be achieved by the 
wording of the constitution.  
 
The role of the constitution is to allocate decision making power to the different decision 
making organs of the company, typically the board as a collective body (or someone to 
whom it has delegated particular authority) and the members’ meeting. The typical 
distinction is between management power, given to the board, and control power which is 
given to the members’ meeting.3 Management power refers to the power to manage the 
business of the company, while control power refers to the traditional role of members 
deciding on who shall sit on the board and exercise the management power by being able to 
vote for or against directors. Certain types of significant decisions such as: 
 whether the wind up the company voluntarily (see s 491) 
 whether to approve related party transactions (see s 208) 
 whether to approve a capital reduction (see s 256C) 
are given specifically to the members’ meeting for approval. If a company is listed on the 
ASX then the ASX Listing Rules may also require that certain management decisions obtain 
shareholder approval. 
 
                                                     
3 See further Jason Harris, Company Law: Theories, Principles and Applications, 2nd ed, 2015, LexisNexis 
Butterworths, Ch 6. 
Once the constitution has allocated decision making power to the organs of the company 
that power allocation can only be changed by amending the constitution. It is clear that the 
directors cannot use management power to distort the exercise of control power by the 
members, such as by issuing shares for the improper purpose of defeating an unwanted 
takeover or issuing shares to give themselves or someone else majority control of the 
members’ meeting.4  
 
It is also clear that the capacity of the members’ meeting to pass resolutions cannot 
mandate how the directors are to exercise their management power, at least where the 
constitution or s 198A gives the board management power. This is often expressed as the 
Parker principle, after National Roads & Motorists’ Association v Parker (1986) 6 NSWLR 
517, where McLelland J said (at 522): 
‘it is no part of the function of the members of a company in general meeting by 
resolution, i.e as a formal act of the company, to express an opinion as to how a 
power vested by the constitution of the company in some other body or person 
ought to be exercised by that other body or person.’ 
 
This is supported by long standing authorities such as Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter 
Syndicate Co Ltd v Cuninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34; Gramophone & Typewriter Ltd v Stanley 
[1908] 2 KB 89.  
 
More recently Barrett J explained in Taiqi Investments (Aust) Pty Ltd v Winlyn Developments 
Pty Ltd (2011) 86 ACSR 197; [2011] NSWSC 1218 at [19]: 
‘unless a clear contrary intention is shown, functions assigned to the company in 
general meeting are not exercisable by the board of directors and likewise those 
given to the board of directors are not exercisable by the company in general 
meeting.’ 
 
Similarly, in John Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd v Shaw [1935] 2 KB 113 at 134, Greer LJ said: 
‘A company is an entity distinct alike from its shareholders and its directors. Some of 
its powers may, according to its articles, be exercised by directors, certain other 
powers may be reserved for the shareholders in general meeting. If powers of 
management are vested in the directors, they and they alone can exercise these 
powers. The only way in which the general body of the shareholders can control the 
exercise of the powers vested by the articles in the directors is by altering their 
articles, or, if opportunity arises under the articles, by refusing to re-elect the 
directors of whose actions they disapprove. They cannot themselves usurp the 
powers which by the articles are vested in the directors any more than the directors 
can usurp the powers vested by the articles in the general body of shareholders.’ 
 
These statements highlight the inherent tension between the theory and reality of modern 
corporate law. The predominant agency theory of corporate law, with its shareholder 
primacy norm, makes it understandable for shareholders to believe that they are the 
owners of the company and the directors should be exercising management power only for 
                                                     
4 See Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd [1974] AC 821; Whitehouse v Carlton Hotel Pty Ltd (1987) 162 
CLR 285. 
their benefit. But the shareholders are not the principal of the company, and the directors 
are not their agents. As Owen J explained in the Bell case:5 
‘It is, in my view, incorrect to read the phrases 'acting in the best interests of the 
company' and 'acting in the best interests of the shareholders' as if they meant 
exactly the same thing. To do so is to misconceive the true nature of the fiduciary 
relationship between a director and the company. And it ignores the range of other 
interests that might (again, depending on the circumstances of the company and the 
nature of the power to be exercised) legitimately be considered.’ 
 
Shareholder activists may talk of incompetent company managers wasting ‘their money’, 
but of course shareholders’ equity funds are the property of the company and merely 
provide consideration for the equitable chose in action that the shareholders have against 
the company through their rights under the constitution and the Corporations Act.  
 
Company directors have a duty to act in the best interests of the company as a whole, not 
merely address the concerns of particular investors. It is a delicate balance that the board 
must continually make by keeping the variety of corporate stakeholders happy while 
trusting that the shareholders (as the only stakeholder with the power to vote) do not vote 
them out of office.  
 
With this balance in mind, we can now turn to consider two recent cases involving different 
types of shareholder activists using company resolutions to pursue their agenda. 
 
USING MEMBERS’ MEETINGS FOR SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 
(a) Re Molopo Energy Ltd; Molopo Energy Ltd v Keybridge Capital Ltd (2014) 104 ACSR 
46; [2014] NSWSC 1864 
 
This case concerned attempts by a shareholder of Molopo Energy to require the company to 
undertake a substantial capital reduction and a return of capital to shareholders. The 
shareholder (Keybridge) held just over 5% of the shares at the relevant time (although it has 
since moved up to 19%). Keybridge’s proposed resolution to undertake a capital reduction 
was rejected by the Molopo board as falling within the management power of the board 
under the company’s constitution. That management power was expressed in the 
constitution to be subject to the requirement that any decision by the board to sell or 
dispose of the main undertaking must be ratified by the members in a general meeting.  
 
Keybridge served the company with two further proposed resolutions. The first resolution 
proposed to amend the constitution so that management power of the board would be 
subject to a new power of the members in a general meeting to cause the company to 
reduce its capital. This came with a further ordinary resolution which was to implement the 
capital reduction that had been rejected by the Molopo board previously.  
 
The push to cause the company to reduce its capital occurred at a time when the company 
was involved in significant litigation in Canada which could result in a substantial liability. If 
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the capital reduction occurred, then the company’s ability to meet a future liability arising 
from the litigation would be questionable.  
 
The court (White J) held that the members meeting could not require the company to 
propose a capital reduction because Chapter 2J of the Corporations Act provided for the 
decision about whether to undertake a capital reduction was to be made by the directors 
and, in certain situations, that decision then needed to be approved by the members’ 
meeting. His Honour held that to allow a reduction to be proposed and effectuated by the 
members would lessen the protection given to creditors by Chapter 2J. Furthermore, if 
directors were required by the members to undertake a reduction of capital this could 
trigger liability for the directors under insolvent trading laws.  
 
This was not a members’ resolution that infringed on the management power of the board 
simply stated in the constitution, it was a members’ resolution that tried to use a power 
given to the board by the Corporations Act itself, which was impermissible. Once it was 
determined that the resolution was improper, then the company had no obligation to 
distribute the resolution to the members or to convene the meeting for voting on the 
invalid resolution: Turner v Berner [1978] 1 NSWLR 66; Parker.  
 
Given the potential prejudice to creditors that could arise from a capital reduction, the court 
held that the second resolution (i.e. to effectuate the capital reduction) was also invalid as 
any such capital reduction would contravene s 256B, even if the constitution allowed it. 
 
Keybridge proposed a further resolution to replace the existing directors which was 
challenged by the company as involving a potential future breach of duty as any newly 
appointed directors may be mindful to act in accordance with Keybridge’s wishes and seek 
to implement the capital reduction. This was rejected by the court as being unsubstantiated 
by the evidence and this resolution was permitted to be distributed to the members. 
Subsequently, the company appointed a non-executive director proposed by Keybridge.  
 
While Keybridge has so far been unsuccessful in its campaign to cause the company to 
return greater funds to shareholders, it was successful in securing a board position as a 
result of its activist stance. 
 
(b) Australasian Centre for Corporate Responsibility v Commonwealth Bank of Australia 
(2015) 107 ACSR 489; [2015] FCA 785 
This case concerned more than 100 members of CBA who proposed resolutions at the next 
members’ meeting of CBA. The members were led by ACCR which has had a long running 
campaign relating to carbon emissions by projects funded by Australian banks. With greater 
public awareness and concern regarding climate change, many financial institutions have 
increased their reporting relating to carbon emissions.  
 
The ACCR as representative for more than 100 CBA shareholders submitted written notice 
to CBA of 3 potential resolutions. These were expressed to be alternatives: 
1. In the shareholders’ opinion it would be best for the company to provide a report on 
carbon emissions produced by activities funded by the company and to disclose how 
the company was dealing with risks associated with ‘unburnable carbon’; or  
2. To express the shareholders’ concern as part of the consideration of the company 
directors’ report at the absence of a report on carbon emissions and the 
management of risks associated with unburnable carbon; or  
3. That the company’s constitution be amended to require the directors’ report to 
provide information on carbon emissions arising from CBA funded activities. 
The bank only included the third resolution with its AGM notice to members. It included 
information in the notice to members that stated it was of the view that the proposed 
resolution was not in the best interests of the company and its members. The bank claimed 
advised the ACCR that the other two resolutions were within management power and not 
matters within the power of the members. 
 
ACCR sought declarations from the court that all three proposed resolutions were valid 
(although the parties accepted that the third proposed resolution was valid). ACCR 
challenged the legal status of the Parker principle and argued that as its resolutions were 
only advisory opinions of the members they were not binding on the company and not an 
infringement on management power. Furthermore, the ACCR argued that the second 
resolution was within the power of members to exercise a non-binding vote on the 
company’s remuneration report. 
 
The court applied the Parker principle and held that the bank’s constitution did not provide 
the members’ meeting with a power to make resolutions offering their opinion to the 
board, although this would not preclude the board seeking the views of members, but the 
members could not force the board to consider their views by passing an advisory opinion 
resolution.  
 
The court also held that the power contained in s 250S (which requires the company give 
members a reasonable opportunity to ask questions and to give comments at the AGM) was 
inconsistent with any residual power to the members’ meeting to give advisory resolutions.  
Furthermore, while members were given the power to make a non-binding vote on the 
remuneration report, this was not a power to vote on the entirety of the directors’ report 
and hence resolution 2 was invalid. 
 
Finally, the court held that as the letter under s 249N allowed for the resolutions to be put 
as alternatives, even if the first two resolutions were valid it was open for the bank to 
choose which resolution would be put to the AGM. 
 
Although the ACCR was unsuccessful in changing the CBA constitution, or in giving advisory 
opinions it has obtained greater disclosure from all large banks on environmental emissions 
and it continues it activist program by attending bank AGMs and asking questions about 
environmental matters. 
 
This case is significant because it confirms the force of the Parker principle and affirms the 
limitations on the power of a members’ meeting to direct or advise the board on their 




Investor activists are not going away, and recent indications suggest that activist behaviour 
will become increasingly common for Australian companies. Section 249N is an important 
weapon in the activist’s toolkit, but as these two recent decisions show that weapon is still 
limited to the proper power of the members’ meeting which must not infringe or usurp the 
managerial power of the board unless the constitution of the company so provides. Even if 
an activist attempts to change the constitution, they cannot force the board to exercise a 
power that is specifically given to them by the Corporations Act rather than arising generally 
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